OK, a bit of a long story, I got up one morning and found 150 credit card transactions for $0.10 and $0.12 so I went to my credit card processor (authorize.net) and found 1300+ attempts, most of them denied, but 152 of them still in the authorize hold. I called Authorize.net, and they had me turn on velocity filtering, a minimum transaction amount, and change my transaction key.
I'm REALLY sure this was NOT done through the store software, as it would have run up a large number of GET and POST requests on the web server, and I did not see that.
So, somehow, somebody must have gotten my merchant account # or my API credentials on Authorize.net
I have a daily program that checks for any updated files on the system.
It found, when I changed my transaction key in osCmax, that a new file was generated:
~/osc2.5/catalog/cache/cachefile.inc.php
this file has cleartext of all my Authorize.net API credentials and my Fedex API credentials! It also has at least a portion of my USPS and PayPal credentials.
It seems a bit of a bug to have all this info in a persistent file under the catalog tree. Now, I have a .htaccess file that keeps this whole directory /catalog/cache
non-readable from the web server, but this still seems like a dangerous thing to leave around. Is there any reason this file is even created? Why is it in the catalog tree instead of the renamed "admin" section? Shouldn't this file at least be deleted after the update is performed into the database? This is an osCmax 2.5 RC1 system.
Thanks,
Jon
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